were seized by army bandits; there was hardly any force left to resist the attack of the Lolo. Everywhere they became reckless and fearless and retained no respect whatever for the Chinese. In the eighth year of the Republic, the Lolo of Liang-shan began a large-scale offensive. This rebellion was instigated by the prominent branches of En-cha and Wu-ch'i of Lei-po hsien, Wu-po of Ma-pien hsien, A-ho and Su-ko of Yueh-sui hsien, and Pa-chü (also known as Pa-ch'i) and A-shih of Chao-chüeh hsien. These large branches united all the I of Liang-shan into a systematic organization, and taking separate routes, marched toward the Chinese territory. Finally in May of that year, they broke through the guard-posts of Ma-ching-tzŭ in Lei-po hsien; in June they occupied the city of San-lêng-kang and captured about 800 people, 380 soldiers, and more than 100 rifles. All of Lei-po west of Wu-chiao, extending for more than 100 li, was lost to the I; territories such as Tung-ning-hsiang and Li-tzŭ-p'ing in the eastern section of Lei-po were also lost. In June of the same year, the city of Chao-chüeh hsien, attacked by the combined forces of Pa-cha chia and A-shih chia, fell, and the entire hsien was occupied by the I, as were the guard-posts of Yu-cha-p'ing and Yen-feng in Ma-pien hsien. Only Kan chia of O-pien did not participate in this uprising. It was a strictly organized military maneuver, careful in planning, swift in movement, and vast in scope. The Chinese could not react in time and suffered heavy losses. All their lands and properties were seized, their houses burned, and the streets ruined. The foundation upon which the Chinese were gradually able to make a stand through hundreds of years was swept away in one stroke. Several ten thousands of Chinese men and women either fled, were killed, /123/ or captured to become Wa-tzu; there hardly was anyone fortunate enough to escape. The I who had swept out of their mountain fastness succeeded in reaching Lei-po on the east, Hsi-ch'ang on the west and O-pien on the north, in all which places they struck directly at the hsien cities. Although these did not fall, they were nevertheless in imminent danger. The vast outlying districts between the cities were naturally beyond Chinese control. I troubles were worst in the ten years from the eighth to the seventeenth year of the Republic. The inhabitants in all the surrounding hsien feared for their own safety, and even local officials were often killed. There are two outstanding examples. In the ninth year of the Republic, the I in the sub-hsien of Peng-tzŭ-tsun revolted and murdered the assistant magistrate Huang Lung-hsun; and in the autumn of the fifteenth year, the magistrate Lo Cheng-kuan was also murdered in Peng-tzu-tsun

175
175
669

175 in addition to a loss of 500 guns.

• 669 After the eighteenth year, order in Szechwan province was gradually restored, and the I were more submissive. At the same time there were also a few local military commanders who were able to subjugate the I more effectively. In the nineteenth year, Regiment-commander Wang Lin-sheng personally led an army to enter Liang-shan from Lei-po, felling trees to clear roads and binding bamboos to make bridges; then, going through Ta-ku-tui and Hsiao-ku-tui, he attacked Huang-mo-keng. On the way the army camped for about seven days at Li-chia-tsao and organized the Wa-tzu around the neighborhood into pao-chia /tithings/. Although Wang withdrew from Liang-shan not long after, this was the first time since the Republic that the military influence of the Chinese extended west of Mu-kou-p'o. But the man who had the most effective control over the I in the last 20 odd years was Teng Hsiu-t'ing, who made several expeditions into the area of Chao-chüeh, San-wan-ho, Szu-k'uai-pa-tzu, and almost recaptured Chao-chüeh city. Unfortunately the outbreak of the civil war in Szechwan cut short his success. Even today the Lolo of Liang-shan fear the name of Teng, which they evoke in order to stop children from crying. From this one can see that action only can bring about results and that it is not impossible to conquer Liang-shan.

175 311 In recent years, Chinese policy toward the I stresses land reclamation. This matter was first directed by the 24th army. In the seventeenth year of the Republic the army reorganized the Development Department of Lei, Ma, Ō, P'ing, with the aim of constructing highways running through these four hsien. They were, however, unable to carry out this plan though slight progress was made in the reclamation of lands. Later a rearrangement of military districts put these hsien under the jurisdiction of the 17th division of the Szechwan army. Around the twenty-fifth year, this division established a reclamation farm at Ch'ing-k'o of Lei-po hsien, and Company-commander Fan Yung-hui was appointed director in charge of the reclamation program. Fan was a capable man, and his chief assistants were soldiers from the original 17th division. With sufficient strength and strict organization, his method of using troops as farmers easily attained results. Within five years after the establishment of this farm many of the cultivable barren lands previously occupied and laid waste by the I were opened up. The local people say that after the eighth year of the Republic, nine-tenths of Lei-po hsien had fallen to the I. /124/ After these endeavors the land was partially recovered, although

eight-tenths of the entire hsien was still in I hands up to the thirtieth year. In addition to Lei-po, the hsien of Ma-pien and O-pien also made similar efforts. Later, around the twenty-ninth year, the government of Szechwan again established a Reclamation Bureau for Lei, Ma, O, P'ing, and Mr. Jen Ying-ts'ang was appointed as head. He maintained the status quo of the reclamation work but put it entirely under the Bureau's control. After ten years these attempts at reclamation have produced considerable results. Unfortunately, political measures were not in keeping with these efforts so that conflicts between the Chinese and I are worse than ever. The I are very resentful over reclamation, for they think that the Chinese are using military power to seize their territories. Their enmity toward the Chinese has grown to such a degree that recently the I of O-pien, who have never rebelled, have also begun to agitate. Henceforth it may be borne in mind that there are disadvantages as well as advantages in the program. At any rate this is definitely not the way for a complete settlement of the I region. From now on, those who would discuss reclamation should consider every point in detail before taking action.

Shortly after the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Central Government moved west, and the problem of the I region of Liang-shan gradually came to the attention of the public. After the organization of Sikang into a province, rehabilitation of the Ning districts was considered one of the important projects. A committee for investigating I affairs in these districts was established. It was later reorganized as the "Reclamation Committee of the Ning Districts," with a larger scope of duties, although I affairs were still its main concern. Great progress was made within three years. Aggression and appeasement policies--with more emphasis on the latter--were tried at the same time. Although the basic principles are the same as those adopted in the Ch'ing period, these methods produced better results because of more skillful operations and stricter organization. Take, for instance, the city of Chao-chüeh which fell in the eighth year of the Republic and remained in I hands for 20 years. Although the provincial government formerly appointed a magistrate, this magistrate always lived in Hsi-ch'ang and never went into the hsien to perform his duties. The city was reconquered in the twenty-eighth year, but in January of the thirtieth year, it again fell into the hands of the rebellious Pa-chü chia. In March of the same year, however, the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Hsi-ch'ang and the Reclamation Committee sent combined forces to attack and regained it. Communication between Hsi-ch'ang and Chia

669 175 636 Chao-chüeh was again restored under Chinese control. The peculiar situation of the past 20 years was thus brought to an end, marking the progress made recently concerning I affairs.

The majority of those conversant with I affairs agree that the policy toward the I region of Liang-shan must depend somewhat on military strength and repression. Formerly, however, /125/ most 669 175 people have had two kinds of mistaken notions concerning this problem, which should be corrected here. One was the feeling that Liang-shan was difficult to conquer; the other was the belief that a complete military conquest of Liang-shan was necessary in order to produce results. It will now be shown why neither of these two notions is actually correct. First, the combat strength of the I has been overrated. It is true that in the last few centuries the Lolo often made troubles, which became particularly violent after the establishment of the Republic. A close scrutiny, however, reveals that the inability to conquer Liang-shan in former times was really due to the fact that conquest was never attempted. The I caused sporadic disturbances, but they generally dispersed upon the arrival of large troops. If there had been foresight during the Ch'ing period and some soldiers had been sent to occupy the strategic grounds of Niu-ndu-pa and Yeh-la-na-ta inside Liang-shan, these problems would have been resolved long ago and would not have recurred today. It is true that there is certain unity among the I, who can also at times make swift and ingenious military moves. These circumstances, together with topographic difficulties and lack of roads and provisions along the way, may have caused some Chinese commanders to feel that it was a difficult task to subdue the I of Liang-shan. Nevertheless, the obstacles are by no means greater than those found in regions such as Sikang, Tibet, Ch'ing-hai and Mongolia, where military expeditions undertaken during the first years of the Ch'ing period were successful. There would be no difficulty in achieving success in as tiny a region as Liang-shan if the whole matter could be treated seriously and detailed planning be done beforehand, so that the troops might advance with confidence and care, constructing bridges and roads, establishing military posts and securing provisions along the way. Because of their observance of these requirements, famous commanders in the past, such as Liu T'ing-chen of the late Ch'ing period and Teng Hsiu-t'ing of the Republic times, were always victorious in their expeditions against the I. In the past 20 years, some militarists have increased the strength of the Lolo considerably through the unlawful exchange

of guns for opium. However the only weapons of the I are rifles, pistols and muskets, the firing power of which is much inferior to that of the commonly used firearms such as the machine guns and trench motars of the government's regular army. Furthermore, the I, lacking bullets and practice, are unable to aim accurately. Some friends, who have traveled in other I regions, state that the I are most fearful of good marksmen. In a surprise attack, therefore, if one should first kill one or two attackers with a gun, then those remaining, regardless of their number, would all disperse at once. The Lolo of Liang-shan are probably no exception. The recapture of Chao-chüeh city in March of the thirtieth year exemplifies the fact that those with superior weapons can win. In this battle, with only a few soldiers, the government army had to meet a large number of enemies. As it was besieging the city, the I again occupied San-ko-ho and blocked the rear route. But thanks to the machine guns, the army was victorious. Many of those familiar with conditions in Liang-shan believe that if only the government would dispatch a very fine regiment of modern troops, it could without doubt subdue Liang-shan completely. The writer agrees with them. It would be easiest for the troops to take the route eastward from Hsi-ch'ang /126/ and make a direct attack on Huang-mo-keng. Naturally the desired result would be even more quickly attained if the military force was more substantial and attacks were made from all sides. The total number of I in Liang-shan is not large, and available fighters are therefore limited. In former battles they seemed numerous because they assembled from all places. Since they ran very fast and were also familiar with the geography of the region, they could spread news much faster than government troops. If a large army could be speedily assembled and correct military strategy used, the Lolo would not be able to resist. Formerly, because of the amazing speed with which the I assembled in answer to a call, it was believed that they had enormous manpower. The fear thus aroused was due to a false understanding of the situation. The Chinese living in the frontier regions dread the I because the latter are armed while they are not. The solution henceforth is to give a suitable number of weapons to the Chinese so that they may have some means of self-defense. I problems which cause authorities much vexation will thus be greatly reduced. Furthermore the troops sent to occupy Liang-shan must have particularly fine equipment and strict discipline. Only thus will it be possible to avoid some of the evil practices of former times, such as trading guns for opium, and to preserve peace in the I region forever.

669 ● 175